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THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM, IMPERFECT




In GTE SylvaniaI the Supreme Court acknowledged what a group
of law and economics scholars had been arguing for the previous two
decades: 2 vertical restrictions that limit intrabrand competition can have
a desirable effect on interbrand competition.3 The Court approvingly ac-
cepted the argument that the free rider problem might justify a manufac-
turer's use of vertical restrictions. 4 The argument, in its simplest form, is
that if a retailer provides services such as advice and demonstrations to
consumers, a consumer could make use of the service and then buy the
product from a "no- frills" retailer. If the manufacturer cannot control
the free riding proclivities of other retailers, no retailer would find it in
his interest to provide the consumer services. Vertical restrictions shield
a retailer from free riding and make provision of the services profitable.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. 1963, Oberlin College; M.A.
1964, Yale University (Economics); Ph.D. 1970, Yale University (Economics). Part of the work was
completed while the author was a John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics at the University of
Chicago during 1984. The author wishes to thank the John M. Olin Foundation for their support.
The author additionally wishes to thank Peter Carstensen, Frank Easterbrook, Geoffrey Miller, Dan
Polsby, Lou Stem, David Teece and the participants in seminars in economics at Northwestern
University and in law at Yale University for helpful comments on drafts of this Article.
1 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distri-
bution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243 (1975);
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
3 Intrabrand competition refers to competition among sellers of the same product-for exam-
ple, two retailers carrying Magnavox television sets. Interbrand competition refers to the competi-
tion between Magnavox and Sony in selling televisions. By restricting competition among its
dealers, Magnavox can enhance its ability to compete with Sony.
4 The Court said:
Established manufacturers can use... [vertical restrictions] to induce retailers to engage
in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient
marketing of their products. Service and repair are vital for many products, such as
automobiles and major household appliances. The availability and quality of such services affect
a manufacturer's good will and the competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfec-
tions such as the so-called "free-rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in
a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all
provided the services than if none did.
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55.
Free Riding and Retailing
This argument may have been too successful; both courts and com-
mentators have tended to treat customer services as a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for an efficiency-based rationale for vertical restrictions.
Richard Posner, for example, suggests that one way of distinguishing the
"dealer cartel" theory from the "efficiency" theory is to determine
whether the retailer provides customer services.5 In Eiberger v. Sony,6
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the seller did not provide
unique services to the consumer and that the restrictions were therefore
invalid. On the other hand, in Davis-Watkins v. Service Merchandises
the Sixth Circuit held that microwave ovens sold by full-service retailers
were different goods from those sold by discounters, and therefore held
the restrictions in that case valid. Robert Pitofsky, arguing against legal-
izing resale price maintenance (RPM),8 claims that RPM often has been
used in contexts in which special customer services are not provided:
[T]hink for a moment about the product areas in which resale price mainte-
nance has appeared-boxed candy, pet foods, jeans, vitamins, hair sham-
poo, knit shirts, men's underwear. What are the services we are talking
about in these cases? Take jeans. What services does Saks Fifth Avenue
provide that K-Mart does not? In both stores, the jeans are laid on the
table, customers take them to a dressing room, try them on, and buy them.
Is it really plausible that Jordache is fixing the resale price at $32 and deny-
ing the product to K-Mart in order to induce Saks to promote services on
jeans? I think not.9
Pitofsky's implication that a search for customer services in these
contexts would prove futile is probably correct. If one takes a somewhat
different approach, however, a plausible explanation for adopting vertical
restrictions in these and many other contexts can be developed. Rather
than focusing on the provision of retailing services to customers, I em-
phasize the provision of services by retailers to manufacturers.10 This ar-
gument will be developed in the next two sections. The first, Section II,
5 "If no presale services (local advertising, display and so forth) are in fact provided, this is
strong evidence of cartelization." Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, 45 U. Ci. L. REv. 1, 17-18
(1977). In a recent opinion, Judge Posner points to the lack of a plausible free rider argument in
finding that a particular restriction is likely to violate the antitrust laws. General Leaseways, Inc. v.
National Truck Leasing Assoc., 744 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1984) (preliminary injunction granted to
member of association who had been suspended for violating rules restricting members' location).
6 Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d. Cir. 1980).
7 Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise Co., 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982).
8 Resale price maintenance entails any restrictions on pricing discretion imposed by a manufac-
turer on subsequent sellers of the product (wholesalers and retailers). It has been a per se violation
of the antitrust laws since the Dr. Miles case. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons,
220 U.S. 373 (1911). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this last term in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1464 (1984). However, the language of that decision was sufficiently vague to
suggest that the issue is not yet settled.
9 Pitofsky, Why "Dr. Miles" Was Right 8 REG. 27, 29 (1984).
10 The distribution chain, of course, has more links. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite, the dispu-
tants were a manufacturer and a terminated wholesaler. No harm is done by confining the discus-
sion to the manufacturer-retailer relationship.
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focuses on one category of service-rental of shelf space;" Section III
emphasizes a second category-endorsement services. 12
Section IV considers the use of vertical restrictions in "bonding" a
retailer.13 Section V extends the analysis to provide some explanations of
the manufacturers' practice of "forcing" retailers to carry more of a
good, or more products, than they would want to carry.14
The perspective adopted here provides a rich array of plausible ra-
tionales for adopting vertical restrictions. Indeed, this article concludes
that we have almost an embarrassment of riches;' 5 there are too many
explanations. That does not mean that we will be incapable of distin-
guishing among alternative explanations. It simply means that we can-
not get away with ffip answers to hard questions. To understand why
manufacturers adopt a particular retailing strategy, it will be necessary to
engage in a detailed inquiry into the economics of selling those manufac-
turers' products. 16 The key to that inquiry is to recognize that retailing
services represent an input into production of the final product and that
the manufacturer has the same incentive to economize on the use of this
input as on the use of steel, electricity, assembly line workers, and so
forth.
II. RENTING SHELF SPACE
In this section, I will develop three points that help explain why a
manufacturer might utilize vertical restrictions: (a) one retailer's selling
activity can affect the costs of other retailers (for convenience this can be
called the "externality problem"); (b) retailing services often are sold to
manufacturers with contingent compensation; and (c) the package of re-
tailing services can be conveniently summarized as the rental of shelf
space. I shall then explore the interrelationship of these three points.
Externalities and Overfishing
The selling efforts of retailer X can either decrease or increase the
selling costs of retailer Y. If X provides demonstrations of how the pro-
11 See infra text accompanying notes 17-30.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 31-43.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 48-72.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 73-78.
16 There are few such studies in the literature. For some examples, see Goldberg, Resale Price
Maintenance and the FTC: The Magnavox Investigation, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Goldberg, Magnavox Investigation]; Goldberg, Enforcing Resale Price Maintenance:
The FTC Investigation of Lenox, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 225 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Goldberg, Lenox
Investigation]; Goldberg & Erickson, The Law and Economics of Long-Term Contracts: A Case
Study of Petroleum Coke (1984)(unpublshed manuscript on file at Northwestern University Law
Review); Kenney & Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J. L. & EcON. 497 (1983); Marvel,
Exclusive Dealing, 25 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1982); Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics The
Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265 (1984).
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duct should be used, Y can sell the product without incurring the costs of
demonstration. If X is not compensated by Y, the manufacturer, or the
customer, he will cease to provide the service. Since the manufacturer
contracts with all the retailers, it is in a position to internalize the exter-
nality.17 The manufacturer can subsidize X (for example, with coopera-
tive advertising) or control Y (tax, penalize, or otherwise restrict its
choices). This is the standard "customer service," free rider argument. 8
Alternatively, X's activity might raise Y's selling costs. The more
homes that X's salesmen visit in a neighborhood, for example, the lower
the probability that any customer will buy from Y. If X does not take
into account its effect on Y's costs, it could expend too much selling ef-
fort. This is analogous to the well-known "overfishing" problem. 19 If a
large number of fishermen have access to an unregulated fishery, they
will not take into account the adverse consequences of their individual
expenditures on the costs of the other fishermen and, consequently, will
engage in excessive fishing. The costs per fish are greater than they
would be if the fishery could be properly regulated. Similarly, if a manu-
facturer could reduce competition among its salesmen, its selling costs
could be lowered. The manufacturer is in a position to internalize the
externality by restructuring the incentives of X and Y.
In the first instance, the manufacturer can impose vertical restric-
tions on the Ys to enable the Xs to receive the rewards associated with
their activities. In the second instance, the manufacturer can impose the
restrictions on the Xs to penalize their cost-increasing activity. Despite
the obvious similarities between the two problems, the second has re-
ceived much less attention than the first. This imbalance stems from
treating the former as one involving services for customers rather than
for manufacturers. The different perspective adopted in this paper sug-
gests that these are just two variations on the same theme.
Contingent Compensation
The manufacturer that purchases retailing services normally com-
pensates the retailer indirectly by selling the good to the retailer, who
then resells it. It might seem a bit odd to characterize these two transac-
tions for goods as a single transaction regarding a service. However, the
particular form the transaction takes should not obscure the economic
17 That is, the manufacturer is in a position to take into account the effects of the interaction
between the retailers.
18 There could also be an "agglomeration effect." The clustering of sellers of similar products
can increase the patronage of a local retail market, reducing the costs to each retailer of generating
sales. The agglomeration effect is of obvious importance across brands. The clustering of sellers of a
single manufacturer's products is less likely to be significant. There could, however, be an indirect
effect. For example, a successful downtown shopping area attracts a large number of "up-scale"
department stores which carry many of the same high quality lines.
19 See Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 124 (1954).
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functions being served. In this arrangement, compensation is contingent
upon sale of the good. That is, the retailer receives nothing unless the
good is sold, in which case the payment is the difference between the
wholesale price and the retail price-the gross margin.
This form of compensation is not inevitable. Retailers could be paid
in a number of different ways. Customers could be charged an entry
fee;20 shelf space could be rented for a fixed monthly rate; a manufacturer
could lease departments in an outlet and pay a fixed fee, a percentage of
the gross (that is, of total sales revenues), or some combination of the
two; salesmen could be paid on an hourly basis; manufacturers could pay
a fiat monthly rate for a promised level of retailer effort; or retailing serv-
ices could be priced like advertising, on the basis of estimates of foot
traffic certified by independent sources. Nevertheless, the most popular
pricing mechanism is paying the retailer the gross margin. I will not
explore in detail why this is generally the most efficient way to price re-
tail services; for my purposes, it is sufficient that it is so.
Shelf Space Rental
A manufacturer rents shelf space from a retailer in much the same
way as a retailer rents facilities from a landlord.21 The rent a landlord
can charge depends largely upon location, but the rental value can also
be influenced by deliberate policies of the landlord. For example, the
landlord might provide parking spaces, attractive landscaping, advertis-
ing or entertainment to attract crowds, thereby enhancing the value of
the site. Such expenditures could increase the rental value for a broad
class of potential tenants, or they could be targeted at a few product
lines, or even at a particular manufacturer's products.
The same is true of the retailer who rents shelf space to a manufac-
turer, although the contribution of "location" to total rental value is un-
doubtedly smaller. As in the case of the landlord, the retailer's efforts
could enhance the value for a wide set of uses or could be targeted to
more specific needs. Thus, customers could be attracted to a retail outlet
by attractive architecture and displays, by a retailer's reputation for high
product quality and a liberal returns policy, by the quality and quantity
of the store's salespeople, and so on. Retailers could also increase the
rental value for more specific uses. For example, operating a bridal regis-
try will make shelf space more valuable for manufacturers of fine china,
20 Even if the consumer pays an entry fee, the manufacturer can be viewed as ultimately, though
indirectly, paying that fee. Competition in the retailing industry would result in the reduction of the
manufacturer's payment. This is similar to the effect that an increased price for magazines (i.e., an
entry fee) would have on that magazine's advertising rates.
21 The notion that retailers are engaged in renting shelf space provides a clue for explaining the
existence of regular seasonal sales. If the value of shelf space fluctuates in a seasonal pattern, retail-
ers would have an incentive to use "peak load pricing," charging high prices, say, in the Christmas
season and lower prices in the January white sales.
Free Riding and Retailing
crystal, and silverware, but will be of no use to makers of sporting
goods. 22 At the limit, the value-enhancing expenditures could increase
the value of shelf space for only one purpose, the sale of a particular
manufacturer's product (newspaper advertisements, signs, maintaining
inventory, product demonstrations, and so on).
The standard free rider argument has concentrated on the product-
specific services. My argument does not exclude them, but it does not
rely upon them to any extent. It holds even if the only service supplied is
the volume of foot-traffic generated by the location of the retail outlet. If
that were indeed the only service provided, however, it would be unlikely
that contingent compensation would be the most efficient pricing
method. Consider the analogy with the landlord. If a landlord provides
only the location, it generally will rent at a fixed fee. If it takes a more
active role in generating business (for example, the lessor of a shopping
center who engages in crowd-generating advertising), it is more likely
that at least part of the rent will be based on a percentage of the gross (a
form of contingent compensation). Ceteris paribus (other things being
equal), the more the lessor must do to maintain the value of the asset
(location), the more likely it is that some form of contingent compensa-
tion will be used.
Thus, it is likely that the retailer is renting more than "unimproved
location." But it is important to recognize that much of the expenditure
that increases the value of the shelf space does so for a wide range of
products, not simply those of a particular manufacturer. The types of
products specified by Pitofsky would be of this sort.23 The manufacturer
of underwear or knit shirts wants to have his goods displayed to a large
number of potential customers in an attractive atmosphere, and is willing
to pay a higher rental fee for shelf space to a retailer who can provide
this.24
Restricting Intrabrand Competition
We can now bring together these separate strands. Consider a man-
ufacturer who enforces resale price maintenance and permits only one
retailer to carry its product in local markets. 25 Assume that there are no
quantity discounts so that the average wholesale price is constant. The
marginal cost curve is the vertical sum of the wholesale price plus the
22 In listing the characteristics its dealers should have, Lenox, a manufacturer of fine china,
included "a well trained full time bridal consultant with a bridal registry." Goldberg, Lenox Investi-
gation, supra note 16, at 245.
23 See supra text accompanying note 9.
24 This does not, however, mean that he would pay the retailer a higher gross margin. See infra
text accompanying notes 54-58.
25 It is not uncommon for manufacturers utilizing a selective distribution system to restrict both
the number of retailers in a region and their resale prices. Both Lenox and Magnavox had such
policies. See generally Goldberg, Lenox Investigation, supra note 16; Goldberg, Magnavox Investiga-
tion, supra note 16.
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marginal selling costs, MC1 (see Figure 1). With a fixed retail price, the
retailer can vary only its selling effort, which, for convenience, we can
take to mean varying the linear feet of shelf space rented to a manufac-
turer.26 The retailer would equate marginal revenue to marginal cost and
assign enough shelf space to the manufacturer to have expected sales of
Q1. Subsequently I add layers of complications to this story, but those
complications can be left aside for now. 27
What happens if the manufacturer allows a second, identical retailer
to sell in the same market? Both retailers would find that their marginal
costs of selling shift leftward to MC2. If the combined sales of the two
retailers (2Q 2) exceed Q1, adding the second retailer is in the manufac-
turer's interest. The manufacturer should, in this stylized world, con-
tinue to add dealers in the region until the gains from the intensive
coverage are just equal to the costs of the reduction in sales per retailer.
Thus, the greater the adverse effect of an increase in the number of com-
peting retailers upon a retailer's costs, the more likely it is that the manu-







26 While it might seem that shelf space is a "bygone" and ought to be treated as a fixed cost, this
is not the case. Since the shelf space can be rented to other manufacturers, the price it can fetch in its
best alternative use is reflected in the retailer's marginal cost of selling more of the particular
product.
27 The analysis is more complicated if retailers can also compete in the price dimension; for a
formal model that has both selling effort and price as decision variables, see R. SCHMALANSEE, TiiE
EcoNOMICS OF ADVERTISING (1972).
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Note that it is unnecessary to invoke either economies of scale in selling a
product or heterogeneity of retailers for this argument to be valid.28 Nor
is the indirect nature of the retailer's compensation of any consequence.
This argument would be unaffected even if the retailer charged a flat rate
of, say, $2 per linear foot of shelf space per month.
Heterogeneity makes the story more interesting, but raises no new
problems. If the manufacturer allows a discounter to sell in the same
market as his department store clients, he still must take into account the
adverse effect of the discounter's sales on the costs of the other retailers.
This does not mean that the rational manufacturer would inevitably re-
fuse to sell to (or rent shelf space from) discounters. Instead of renting
high price shelf space from Saks Fifth Avenue exclusively, for example, it
might choose to rent less space from Saks and augment this by renting
low-price shelf space from K-Mart. The most efficient arrangement
might even entail Saks and similar firms not carrying the product at all
(compensation would be less than the opportunity cost of their shelf
space).
An analogy might clarify this point. Consider a manufacturer as-
signing salesmen to a territory. It could hire two business-school gradu-
ates (the Saks-quality retailers) who could expect to earn about $50,000
per year given the size of the territory and the form of compensation.
Alternatively, it might replace one of these stalwarts with two lesser
lights (K-Mart types), so that the remaining high-priced salesman could
expect to earn $40,000 per year and the other two $25,000. The firm
might do better yet if it employed no business-school grads and hired
four of the lower quality salesmen at $20,000 per person. A priori, we
cannot ascertain which of these arrangements would be in the manufac-
turer's best interest.
Restrictions on competitors have a second effect. Since the retailer's
compensation is contingent upon selling the goods, the retailer requires
some assurance that the extent of intrabrand competition will not be in-
creased after the retailer agrees to carry the goods. The higher the gross
margin, ceteris paribus, the more costly it is for the manufacturer to pro-
vide the assurance. The high margins make cheating by other retailers
more profitable and therefore raise the costs to the manufacturer of polic-
ing that behavior. Thus, if a retailer promises to sell only in territory A
and receives a 10% commission on his sales, he might be quite content to
confine his activity to that territory. If, however, the commission were
50% he would be more likely to break his promise and to court custom-
ers beyond his territorial boundaries. The retailer might attempt to do
this directly by, for example, soliciting customers in other regions, or
indirectly, by transshipping to unauthorized retailers in other markets.
28 The argument in the text does rely upon diseconomies of scale (rising costs) at the retailer
level. That should be the norm in retailing since the firm will find that the increased sales must be
made to customers living at greater distances from the retail outlet.
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Shielding the retailer from competition in any dimension (price, ter-
ritory, classes of customers) 29 always imposes some costs on the manu-
facturer, so it has strong economic incentives to make the restrictions no
more onerous than necessary. Vertical restrictions are not like virginity:
prices can be maintained a little bit; territories can be a little bit exclu-
sive. The manufacturer has to choose the dimensions in which it will
restrict dealer competition and the extent to which it will do so. Thus, a
manufacturer might want to give some assurance that there will not be
"too much" competition from other dealers in the area carrying the same
brand, but it need not promise that no other dealers would be en-
franchised in the same area. The Magnavox franchise agreement, which
is typical, made clear that the manufacturer reserved the right to expand
the number of retailers in the local market: "Dealers will be geographi-
cally located so as to provide easy customer access to our products, and
yet be so limited as to give Magnavox franchised Dealers a minimum of
dealer competition with a maximum sales potential per Dealer. '30
III. ENDORSEMENT
A second class of services provided to manufacturers by retailers is
endorsement of the product. By carrying a product, the retailer provides
an endorsement that can be valuable. Instead of paying an ex-athlete to
say "I like it" in a television commercial, the manufacturer can pay
Macy's to say "I like it enough to stock it." In effect, the manufacturer
rents the retailer's brand name. Compensation, again, is typically indi-
rect; the retailer's payment is included in the difference between the retail
price and wholesale price. 31 The sale of endorsement services is not a
one-way street. Manufacturers also engage in activities which generate
sales for retailers. If people are drawn to a retail establishment because it
carries a particular brand, the retailer receives a valuable service. This
service, too, is rarely priced directly. The manufacturer is compensated
by the difference between production costs and the wholesale price.
29 A manufacturer could set aside certain classes of customers for particular retailers. For exam-
ple, a computer manufacturer might enfranchise some dealers to sell only to business customers and
others only to individuals. One possible way of dividing customers is for the manufacturer to recog-
nize a sort of "property right in customers"; if dealer X signs up a particular customer, the manufac-
turer's other dealers would either be prevented from dealing with that customer or would be
required to pay "damages" to X if they did sell to that customer.
30 See Goldberg, Magnavox Investigation, supra note 16, at 453. Magnavox sold to retailers in
almost 900 markets. Of these, over 50% had only one Magnavox dealer; only 5% of the markets
had more than six Magnavox retailers. Id. at 496. Lenox computed a "Buyers Potential Statistic" to
determine the number of franchised dealers for a given area. Goldberg, Lenox Investigation, supra
note 16, at 244-45. Automobile dealers have succeeded in obtaining regulations in many states
which grant them greater protection from intrabrand competition than the manufacturers desire.
See Smith, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions of Automobile Distribu-
tion, 25 J. L. & ECON. 125 (1982).
31 Salespeople could also endorse the manufacturer's products. These endorsements might take
the form of comparisons with competing brands, perhaps even other brands carried by the retailer.
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The owner of the brand name, whether it is the manufacturer or the
retailer, possesses a valuable asset. When the owner rents out this asset,
it seeks to be compensated. It also wants to prevent the lessee from en-
gaging in activities that reduce the asset's value. Vertical restrictions can
be used both to facilitate compensation and to maintain the value of the
brand name asset.
Compensation for Brand Name Rental
Howard Marvel argues that a manufacturer may not be adequately
compensated for its endorsement if the retailer finds it profitable to divert
the customers to the products of other manufacturers:
These customer-generating investments create business from which the
dealer can readily profit, but there remains for the manufacturer the prob-
lem of charging its dealers for the additional custom. The simplest way to
do so is by incorporating the charge for the manufacturer promotional ef-
fort into the wholesale price of the good. That is, the manufacturer offers
the dealer a tie-in sale-the physical product together with a set of likely
customers for that product. A problem with this tie-in arises if the dealer is
able to benefit from the manufacturer's promotional effort while avoiding
the promotional charge. If, for example, the additional customers are gen-
erated by advertising investment, the promotional charge is avoided if the
dealer substitutes a similar, but unadvertised, brand for the advertised prod-
uct. Exclusive dealing, by preventing this sort of substitution, provides the
manufacturer with a property right to his promotional investment. 32
In effect, the retailer has the short-run incentive to use "bait and switch"
tactics, attracting customers with brand A and then selling them brand
B.3 3 To put the same point a bit differently, other manufacturers have an
incentive to free ride on the original manufacturer's brand name.
The retailers that enter into contracts with the manufacturers are
not necessarily the only beneficiaries of the manufacturer's endorsement.
If one retailer carries a single brand exclusively, other retailers carrying
inferior brands will have an incentive to locate adjacent to the first re-
tailer, in order to free ride upon the drawing power of the high-quality
product.34 In turn, the manufacturer can select various devices to limit
the damage. It could try to link together its reputation and that of the
retailer (gasoline stations and fast food outlets provide examples). Pri-
vate landowners could internalize the externality by bringing adjacent
retail outlets under common ownership and restricting the free riding of
32 Marvel, supra note 16, at 7.
33 This is the basis for the manufacturers' hostility to having their products used as loss leaders.
The retailer uses the low price of the product (rather than its reputation, as such) to generate sales of
other products. The purpose of a loss leader is to entice the customer into the store, not to sell the
good. Thus, the retailer will combine the low price with as few retailing services as it can-poor
location within the store (lower valued shelf space), poor mixes of sizes and models, and so forth.
See infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
34 I am indebted to Sandy Grossman and Dan Fischel for this observation.
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tenants. Restrictive covenants in shopping center leases would be a
manifestation of this device. In addition, retailers could engage in collec-
tive action to contain this form of free riding. Zoning and other land use
controls could be used in this way.
35
The brand name retailer is faced with an analogous problem. If,
say, Bloomingdale's carries a particular line of dresses, the manufacturer
could take advantage of that valuable endorsement by selling through
less distinguished outlets that trumpet the fact that the goods are sold in
Bloomingdale's. Keeping the goods out of the hands of retailers who free
ride on the quality retailer's brand name is one solution to this problem.
A weaker alternative is clipping the labels from the goods sold through
the lesser retailers.
Maintaining the Value of the Brand Name Asset
A franchisor rents use of its brand name to franchisees. If a fran-
chisee reduces the quality of the product sold, it bears only some of the
costs, while the value of the franchisor's brand name suffers. For exam-
ple, a fast-food franchisee that caters primarily to tourists might find that
a reduction in quality has little direct impact on its future sales. It saves
money by degrading quality and externalizes the costs to the franchisor.
If the franchisor cannot restructure the franchisee's incentives, the sys-
tem breaks down. All of the franchisees have a short-run incentive to
produce a below-average product, and if they do so, they destroy the
value of the brand name. This is a variant on the "lemon problem."' 36 In
the long run, it is in the interest of both franchisor and franchisee to
discourage this "quality free riding." Policing it, however, is costly.
Other things being equal, the larger the number of franchisees, the more
expensive it will be for the franchisor to maintain a given level of quality
and, therefore, the value of the brand name. On the other hand, the
greater the value of the brand name, the greater are the rewards to the
franchisor from aggressive policing to maintain quality.
The foregoing argument is not novel. 37 However, the analogous ar-
35 It makes no difference whether the manufacturer acts directly to prevent the free riding, or
whether the actions are taken by retailers, landlords, or city councils. As long as someone does it,
the manufacturer will be able to capture a higher share of the rewards for generating business.
36 See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
37 "Product reputation is a communal asset. If the costs of degrading quality fall primarily on
the brand name, rather than on the individual dealer, dealers would find that failure to maintain the
brand name would not impair their short-run interests." Goldberg, The Law and Economics of
Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEx. L. REv. 91, 108 (1979). See also R. BORI,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 435-36 (1978) (noting that a national
refiner wishing to appeal to those customers who value a high degree of service must establish the
uniformity of his product and that "the deviation of any significant number of stations from the
product standard will lessen the effectiveness of the refiner's advertising and reduce the appeal that
uniformity makes in itself").
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gument with respect to the brand name retailer has been ignored. The
value of the retailer's endorsement depends, in the long run, on the qual-
ity of the products it sells. If it deals with a single manufacturer, that
manufacturer's quality will determine the value of the retailer's brand
name. If the retailer carries more than one brand, the value of its en-
dorsement will depend on the average quality of the products it carries.
Each manufacturer has an incentive to free ride on the quality of the
others. It is in the long-term interest of the manufacturers not to free
ride on the quality of other manufacturers. Their short-term incentives,
however, are to cheat. The retailer can "promise" to each manufacturer
that the quality of other manufacturers will be at a certain level (or
within a certain range). Ceterisparibus, the larger the number of brands,
the more expensive it will be for the retailer to maintain a given level of
average quality. And, as in the previous case, the greater the value of the
retailer's endorsement, the greater are the benefits from policing quality.
Resale Price Maintenance Across Brands
In all these cases, the owner of the brand name finds it easier to
police the free riding if the number of parties with which it deals is re-
duced. If the number were reduced to one, the problem would be virtu-
ally eliminated (except for the noncontractual free riders discussed
above). This is the solution provided by exclusive dealing. There are real
costs, however, associated with restricting dealings to a single party. A
franchisor obviously would find that restricting itself to a single fran-
chisee was an unacceptable resolution. Retailers would be reluctant to
sacrifice the genuine economies of selling multiple brands through the
same retail outlets. It is possible, however, to reap some of the benefits
associated with exclusive dealing, while at the same time carrying a
broader line of products.
In the remainder of this section, I will discuss one way to accom-
plish this trade-off: the retailer's use of price lines and standard mark-
ups. The manufacturer is told, in effect, that if it wants retailers to carry
its shirts, it must make them so that they are of a quality that could sell
at a retail price of, say, $14.98, with a mark-up of 100% over whole-
sale.38 If the retailer develops a reputation for following this policy for all
products in a particular class, it provides the manufacturer with some
assurance that the retailer will not profit by engaging in "bait and
switch" tactics. The retailer can communicate its quality expectations to
the trade so that inadvertent quality variation will be avoided. The man-
ufacturer's short-term incentive to shade quality still exists, but the price
lines can help raise the cost of cheating (or lower the cost of cooperative
behavior). The price lines restrict the range in which quality can vary
38 The policy can be more complicated than simply stating a price and sticking with it. It can
include scheduled price reductions (sale prices) or scheduled removal of the item from the retail
outlet to an off-price outlet (liquidators, basements, etc.).
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and thereby make it easier for a retailer to determine whether a manufac-
turer is providing a comparable combination of price and quality.39
Moreover, if both the retail price and mark-up are fixed, it is easier for
the retailer to utilize sales figures as an indicator of a manufacturer's
quality. This information would be available too late in the case of a one-
shot transaction between the manufacturer and the retailer. But if the
manufacturer is concerned about its reputation with a particular retailer
or with the trade, the information can be of considerable value.40
The retailer who uses price lines and standard mark-ups is, in effect,
engaging in a variety of resale price maintenance. In this instance, how-
ever, price is maintained within a retail outlet and across brands. It is a
relatively simple step to extend this argument to price maintenance
across outlets. If all retailers used different price lines, manufacturers
would have to produce a large variety of different qualities in order to
conform with the different standards. This would result in shorter pro-
duction runs, causing increased unit costs and probably would make it
more difficult for the manufacturer to maintain .the value of its brand
name to both consumers and retailers. There would be a tendency to
converge on a small number of price lines (and mark-ups) for related
goods.
That manufacturers and retailers do use retail prices and gross mar-
gins for communicating information about anticipated quality sheds light
on an old problem in economics-the "marginal cost controversy. '41
The standard way of reconciling the observation that retailers engage in
mark-up pricing with standard theory is to assert that if the mark-up
does not yield maximum profits, the firm eventually will adjust the mark-
up in the direction dictated by profit maximization. The argument is
correct in identifying the tendency to adjust mark-ups. It is misleading,
however, in its failure to recognize the broader role the mark-up has to
play. If the mark-up is to play its part in conveying quality information,
it is likely to be very sticky.42 The argument is misleading in a second
sense as well. The sticky mark-up conceals the aggressive, continual
repricing of retailing services that occurs; the mark-up is not the price of
the service being provided.43
39 A product that is "too different" can cause problems for a retailer. For example, for a long
time department stores refused to carry blue jeans in men's departments because of the great differ-
ence between jeans and the traditional products. See E. CRAY, LEvi's 114-15 (1978).
40 In the candy industry, when ingredient costs change, firms commonly hold the price constant
and vary the size of the bar. This practice is a plausible response to the quality assurance problem.
41 See Hall & Hitch, Price Theory and Business Behaviour, OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 12 (1939);
Machlup, Theories of the Firm. Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM. EcON. REv. (1967).
42 Department stores have traditionally used "keystone pricing"--setting the retail price at
double the wholesale-for a wide variety of products.
43 This argument will be developed infra text accompanying notes 54-58.
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IV. FUTURE DEALINGS
Paradoxically, one way in which manufacturers can economize on
selling costs is to pay "too much" to retailers. If the privilege of contin-
ued future dealing with a particular manufacturer is a valuable asset, the
retailer, in effect, puts up that asset as its bond of performance. 4" The
greater the value of that asset (the higher the rewards of dealing with this
manufacturer), the more the retailer risks by acting against the manufac-
turer's interests or orders. By threatening to withdraw the carrot of high
annual profits, the manufacturer can induce the retailer to engage in par-
ticular activities that would not otherwise be in that retailer's short-term
interest. In a sense, the manufacturer pays for the privilege of exerting
power over the retailer. Moreover, the high rewards will attract a queue
of willing retailers (the "reserve army of the unemployed"), who provide
the manufacturer with additional freedom to discipline its existing retail
clients.
Vertical restrictions can be used to enhance the value of continued
future dealing with the manufacturer. 45 By establishing the terms on
which other retailers can compete with a given retailer, the manufacturer
can influence the expected future earnings (the size of the bond). The
greater the protection, the greater will be the bond, all other things being
equal.
There are, however, limits to the efficacy of using vertical restric-
tions to provide retailers with high deferred compensation. First, by in-
creasing the retailer's protection from intrabrand competition, the
manufacturer inevitably incurs costs.4 6 Second, the higher the gross
margin, the more vulnerable the arrangement is to cheating by other re-
tailers in the form of price cutting or violation of territorial restrictions.
Third, the manufacturer's incentive to cheat the retailer by terminating
the arrangement prematurely and denying the retailer some of its de-
ferred compensation increases with the size of the bond and the credibil-
ity of the manufacturer's promise suffers as a result. As the gross margin
increases, a manufacturer would find that in order to maintain a given
level of trustworthiness it would have to meet a higher standard of proof
(or otherwise incur costs) in order to terminate a retailer.4 7
44 See Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM.
ECON. REv. 356 (1980); Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
83 AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1983). For a more extensive discussion of the role of "exit barriers" and
the devices used to construct them, see Goldberg, supra note 37, at 97-103.
45 Note that the threat of termination also is a way of enforcing the vertical restrictions. The
argument is not circular since enforcement of the vertical restrictions is a means to an end, not an
end in itself.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
47 I have developed this argument elsewhere. See Goldberg, A Relational Exchange Perspective
on the Employment Relationship in FIRMS, ORGANIZATION AND LABOUR: APPROACHES TO THE
ECONOMICS OF WORK ORGANIZATION 133-34 (F. Stephen ed. 1984).
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V. FORCING
A common complaint of retailers is that manufacturers try to force
them to carry more of the manufacturers' products than they might
otherwise choose to carry. The issue arises in a number of antitrust con-
texts (for example, tie-ins and reciprocity) and in the regulation of cer-
tain franchise relationships. Most states, for instance, have legislatively
prohibited auto manufacturers from forcing dealers to accept unwanted
vehicles. 4 8 Analytically, it makes no difference whether the compulsion
takes the form of a legally binding contract, a non-contractual but practi-
cally binding understanding,4 9 or informal persuasion, such as the ob-
lique suggestion by a salesman that life would be more pleasant if the
retailer carried a more complete selection of the manufacturer's product
line. In all these cases, if the retailer refuses, it runs the risk that some
penalty will be imposed.
Many explanations for this behavior have been proposed in the liter-
ature.50 Tie-ins facilitate price discrimination, allow sellers to avoid price
controls, and so on. In this section, I focus on three explanations based
upon imperfect pricing: (a) fine-tuning the price of shelf space;5 1 (b) influ-




Why would a manufacturer using resale price maintenance be will-
ing to pay the same price for retailing services provided by a major New
York department store as for those of an undistinguished retailer in a
rural area? The question is deceptive, since the mark-up is not really the
price of the retailing services but is only a device for providing indirect
compensation. With compensation paid in the form of the gross margin,
the manufacturer pays the same fee per unit sold to all its retailers, but
not the same fee per unit of retailing service purchased (which is not ob-
48 See Smith, supra note 30, at 136-37, 141.
49 Major oil companies have influenced the choice of tires, batteries, and accessories by their
dealers in many ways short of overt tie-ins. These have often run afoul of the antitrust laws. See,
eg., FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
50 See, eg., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171-84 (1976); Baker,
The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REv. 1235,
1257-61 (1980); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
51 See infra text accompanying notes 54-58.
52 See infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
53 See infra text accompanying notes 65-72. The list is not meant to be exhaustive. A manufac-
turer could use the high rewards from carrying a subset of its products as an inducement to a retailer
to carry its new products. In effect, the manufacturer rents its reputation to the new product. While
the implicit "rental" does not have to take place within an integrated firm, that will often be the most
efficient way of doing it. It is likely that since 1970 Levi Strauss has used the high profitability of its
basic jeans as a lever for gaining shelf space for new products. See L. Rush, A Study in Vertical
Restrictions: The Levi Strauss Case (March 1984) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, U.C. Davis
Dept. of Econ.).
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servable). If the only retailing service provided were shelf space rental,
the fixed gross margin would result in different monthly rentals being
paid to the retailers. The major department store might receive a sub-
stantial payment, while the undistinguished retailer would obtain only
modest compensation. The existence of resale price maintenance does
not, therefore, mean that the manufacturer pays the same price for shelf
space to all retailers. There is no reason to believe, however, that the
pricing mechanism would accurately price any particular retailer's shelf
space.
The retailer maximizes profits by equating its marginal costs to the
retail price (see Figure 1). Were the resulting implicit price of shelf space
too high, the manufacturer could reduce it by forcing the retailer to carry
more goods than the retailer desired. 54 The manufacturer would con-
front the retailer with an all-or-nothing offer telling the retailer either to
allocate additional shelf space to the manufacturer's product or risk ter-
mination. Instead of asking for more of the retailing input directly, the
manufacturer could require the retailer to buy more units of the product
than usual, or it could establish a sales quota for the retailer that ex-
ceeded its profit-maximizing quantity. The marginal profit of the retailer
from the additional selling effort provided would be negative but so long
as the total profits exceeded zero, the retailer would find accepting the
offer worthwhile.
The all-or-nothing offer is a form of tying or "bundling." The sale of
the good is conditioned upon purchase of other units of the same good.
The tie need not be to the good itself. Instead, it could be across prod-
ucts, transactions, or time. That is, all sorts of bundling arrangements-
tie-in sales, full-line forcing, reciprocity, requirements contracts (inter-
temporal tie-ins)55-- could be used in this manner.
That bundling could be used by a monopolist to facilitate price dis-
crimination 56 and metering57 is well-known. I am adding a twist to that
argument. There need be no monopoly power at all. The bundling is
simply a manifestation of normal economic activities: ascertaining the
value of an economic good (shelf space) and haggling over its price.
54 If, on the other hand, the retailer's revenue from carrying a particular manufacturer's prod-
ucts would not cover the opportunity cost of the shelf space, the manufacturer could increase its
offer price indirectly by making side payments in cash or in kind to the retailer. Free in-store dis-
plays and putting clothing on hangers are examples.
55 In the Standard Stations case Justice Frankfurter wrote: "Tying agreements serve hardly any
purpose beyond the suppression of competition. ... Requirements contracts, on the other hand,
may well be of economic advantage to buyers as well as sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to
the consuming public." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). The latter
are, of course, a subset of the former.
56 See Adams & Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q. J. ECON. 475
(1976); Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block Booking, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 152.
Stigler's analysis of "block booking" is almost certainly wrong. See Kenney & Klein, supra note 16,
at 498-99.
57 See Bowman, supra note 50, at 23.
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There is no real difference between the manufacturer who says, "If you
don't reduce your shelf space price, I shall go elsewhere," and one who
says, "If you don't meet your sales quota, I shall terminate you." The
similarity is obscured by the indirect manner in which the price of shelf
space is quoted. What appears to be price discrimination results, para-
doxically, in the price paid per foot of shelf space equalizing over differ-
ent manufacturers. That is, different manufacturers displaying at Macy's
will pay approximately the same price for equivalent shelf space. Like-
wise, each manufacturer would pay very different prices for shelf space in
different outlets because the value of the rental space differs. (This would
be analogous to a law firm paying $2 per square foot per month for office
space in the downtown area and at the same time paying $1 per square
foot for space in the suburbs.)
One could argue that big firms should not be able to use their bar-
gaining strength to reduce the price of their inputs. I do not find this
position attractive, but it is not indefensible. It is probably consistent
with the underlying rationale of Justice Black's tying opinions58 and the
goals of some proponents of the Robinson-Patman Act. Nevertheless, it
should be clear that even if the law did penalize certain forms of bun-
dling, thereby raising the costs of certain bargaining strategies to manu-
facturers, it is by no means clear that small retailers (the presumed
beneficiaries of this policy) would gain. The small retailers are more
likely to end up with highly priced, but unused shelf space.
The Price-Effort Trade-off
Quantity forcing can be a variant of maximum resale price mainte-
nance. If the retailer determines the retail price, its profit-maximizing
decisions will not be optimal from the manufacturer's point of view. The
manufacturer has an incentive to constrain the retailer in the quantity or
price dimension, in order to make its profit-maximizing decisions more
consistent with the manufacturer's interests. If the retail and wholesale
prices are independent, the retailer's unconstrained incentive is to set the
price too high; if, however, the wholesale price is a function of the retail
price, the retailer's incentive is to set the price too low.
I will discuss the latter case first. Two examples are the movie dis-
tributor that establishes its rental as a percentage of the gross ticket sales,
and the auctioneer that sells items on consignment for a percentage of the
selling price. 59 The retailer could divert revenues from the manufacturer
by selling the item at a low price and raising the price on complementary
goods. A low admission price to the theater, for instance, could be com-
58 See Baker, supra note 50, at 1296-1305 (citing Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1 (1958)).
59 For example, Sotheby's catalogue states:
Our standard commission for selling fine art property at auction is 10% of the successful bid
price of each lot sold for more than $3000 and 15% of the successful bid price of each lot sold
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bined with a high price on popcorn.6° Moreover, the retailer's incentive
to search for the top price is attenuated. The retailer can pursue profits
by providing more selling effort or by lowering the price. The retailer
might be indifferent between a high effort/high price and low effort/low
price combination if the two yielded the same profits at the retail level.
But, since the initial seller's reward depends upon the price, he will not
be indifferent. This is a variation on the loss leader theme.61 A minimum
price can restrict the seller's ability to profit at the principal's expense.
Fine arts auctions, for example, often allow the principal to establish a
price floor.62 Alternatively, the principal might impose a quantity maxi-
mum, on the assumption that anyone selling at that rate must be cheat-
ing on price.
Let us return to the case in which the retailer buys at a fixed whole-
sale price and is free to resell at whatever price it would like. The retailer
has the incentive to choose a retailing strategy that results in a higher
price and lower selling effort than the manufacturer would prefer. This
is more likely to be the case (a) the more the manufacturer has shielded
the retailer from intrabrand competition, and (b) the stronger the brand
identity of the manufacturer. To deal with this problem, manufacturers
could impose maximum resale prices.63 Or, as in the previous case, they
could focus on quantity instead. The manufacturer could set quotas, de-
liver more output than the retailer wanted, and so forth.64
In other parts of this paper, I have assumed that the manufacturer
would find it attractive to use resale price maintenance. In this section, I
explicitly dropped that assumption and instead focused on instances in
which the manufacturer wants the retailer to search for profitable retail
prices. In these instances, it is often in the manufacturer's interest to
constrain the retailer's decision in the quantity or price dimension. Thus,
we have one more possible explanation for vertical restrictions (minimum
for $3000 or less, in either case together with an amount equal to the 10% premium paid by the
buyer as part of the total purchase price.
CHINESE WORKS OF ART, PAINTINGS, TEXTILES AND FURNITURE 4 (Sotheby's catalogue for auc-
tion on Oct. 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Sotheby's].
60 See generally Kenney & Klein, supra note 16, at 516-31.
61 The dependence of the wholesale price on the retail price is not necessary for the loss leader
problem to exist. It does, however, involve both features noted in the text: the retailer gains by
diverting the customers to purchasing something else, and the retailer can substitute retail price cuts
for selling effort in a way that results in less compensation for the manufacturer.
62 Sotheby's policy is as follows:
A 'Reserve' is the confidential minimum price agreed between the seller and us, below which
the lot will not ordinarily be sold. . . . Our standard advice to sellers is that reserves be set at
a percentage of the mean of the estimates, generally somewhat below the low estimate shown in
the estimate sheet provided with this catalogue. In no case do we permit a reserve to exceed the
high estimate shown in the estimate sheet.
Sotheby's, supra note 59, at 6. When petroleum coke was sold on commission, the contracts usually
included a minimum price. See Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 16, at 21-25.
63 See Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886, 891 (1981).
64 Smith, supra note 30, at 128, makes this argument with regard to automobile dealerships.
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or maximum resale price maintenance), as well as for various forms of
forcing.
Cream-Skimming
If a manufacturer's product line includes both popular and unpopu-
lar models, the retailers' short-term incentive is to "skim the cream,"
ordering only the popular models. However, this behavior can adversely
affect the long-term interests of the manufacturer and the retailers. Con-
sequently, the manufacturer will commonly try to induce (or force) the
retailers to carry a broad product line which includes some of the less
popular models.
It is useful to begin the analysis by considering a manufacturer that
is vertically integrated into retailing and that produces a line of products
with fairly regular model changes. A large share of the production costs
are product-specific and are incurred before the manufacturer has relia-
ble information about the relative popularity of the different products.
Moreover, shifting capacity from unpopular to popular models becomes
more expensive as time passes. When the market information does be-
come available, a considerable amount of product-specific costs already
has been sunk. At that time, the manufacturer must take into account
the incremental production costs for its different models (which, by as-
sumption, are rather low until the capacity constraint is approached) and
the incremental costs of selling the different models (which implicitly in-
clude price reductions). Suppose model A proves to be extremely popu-
lar and model B rather unpopular. The manufacturer would find that its
most profitable strategy would be to continue producing the less popular
line, thus incurring the low marginal production cost, and to spend a
considerable amount on retailing effort. (The production rate need not,
of course, remain constant; it will depend to a great extent upon the an-
ticipated costs of selling.) The firm would incur low marginal selling
costs on the popular items and high marginal selling costs on the unpop-
ular ones. 65
65 The cream-skimming model depends upon the unpopular models having a positive value.
Even if these models had no resale value and had to be scrapped, there would still be interesting
implications for the economics of retailing. The manufacturer would have an inventory problem:
how much of the goods should be produced and stocked at the retail outlets? A reduction in the
costs of production or a reduction in the costs of holding inventory would result in an increase in the
amount the firm would hold at its various outlets and would also result in a higher proportion of
goods being scrapped. Thus, the scrappage rate for magazines is about 40%, and is even higher for
comic books and newspapers. See Buchan & Siegfried, An Economic Evaluation of the Magazine
Distribution Industry, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 19, 34-39 (1978). If the variance of sales across models
increases, the share of goods that must be scrapped also increases. Since these costs must ultimately
be covered if the firms are to survive, the production costs per unit will be a smaller share of the
selling price the greater the variance. Women's clothing, for example, would have a higher manu-
facturer's markup than would men's clothing.
Suppose now that salvage value is not zero. The greater the salvage value, other things being
equal, the lower the cost of holding the inventory. This is fairly obvious and does not add much to
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What if the manufacturer were not integrated into retailing? The
production and retailing decisions must now be coordinated across orga-
nizational boundaries. If the wholesale prices were completely flexible,
there would be no difficulty, since the wholesale price would reflect the
marginal production cost. If wholesale prices were not perfectly flexible
however, the retailer would have an incentive to engage in actions that
were not in the long-term interest of the parties.66
Consider the extreme case in which the manufacturer sets the
wholesale prices before any market information is available and sticks to
those prices for the entire model year. The retailer would attempt to buy
the popular models, which are easy to sell, and shun the less popular
ones. In the short run, the individual retailer benefits from this cream-
skimming. However, if manufacturers learn to anticipate such behavior
by the retailers, they will raise their average wholesale price to cover the
costs of the unsold, unpopular models.67 It might, therefore, be in the
long-term interests of the manufacturer and the retailers to devise tech-
niques to discourage the retailer from engaging in cream-skimming.6
The manufacturer could condition certain discounts on the retailer's car-
rying a "representative" line, establish quotas in different product catego-
ries, or ship unordered products to dealers who would then be
responsible for disposing of them.69 It could also require the retailer to
buy the goods before the market information became available. If a re-
tailer engaged in too much cream-skimming, the manufacturer could pe-
nalize it by "losing orders," by favoring loyal dealers when rationing
"hot" models, or by making the termination of the agreement more
likely.70
The more the costs of resale vary across a firm's product line, all
other things being equal, the more difficult it will be to constrain cream-
skimming by retailers. The retailers' sales of the items that are difficult
the previous analysis. However, if salvage value is not fixed, more interesting issues arise. Thus,
businessmen have incentives to devise techniques to increase the scrap value (for example, day-old
bread, in-store sales, and sales through liquidators). One manifestation of this would be to increase
the selling effort on slow movers while maintaining the retail price; this is the case discussed in the
text.
66 The fact that manufacturers often are willing to incur these costs of imperfect coordination
suggests that there exist considerable diseconomies of vertical integration.
67 Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J. L. & ECON. 27, 37-39
(1982), and Kenney & Klein, supra note 16, at 509, refer to the problem as "oversorting" or
"oversearching."
68 Manufacturers would have the incentive to engage in more extensive pre-production market
research and to take other actions that would avoid some of the costs arising from the retailer's
cream-skimming.
69 For examples of all these practices, see Goldberg, Magnavox Investigation, supra note 16, at
470-73, 483-85.
70 Kenney & Klein, supra note 16, at 516-31, state that the block booking engaged in by major
motion picture distributors prior to the Paramount decree was a device for constraining cream-
skimming or oversearching. An exhibitor that refused to accept one unpopular film in a block of N
films had to pay liquidated damages equal to 1/N of the block price.
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to sell are subsidized by sales of the popular items. (Recall that with
contingent compensation, the costs of selling are borne only by the "suc-
cesses"; with cream-skimming, the relatively successful products carry
some of the costs of selling the relatively unsuccessful products.) If it
must compete with retailers that sell the popular items in the line but do
not have to bear the costs of carrying the other items, the problems of the
full-line retailer are exacerbated. 71
The entire argument hinges upon one factor: the wholesale prices of
the manufacturer's product line cannot adjust perfectly to reflect new
market information that becomes available after a considerable amount
of product-specific costs has been sunk. For our purposes, it is not nec-
essary to determine why the prices perform this task imperfectly; it is
sufficient to note that when they do fall short of perfection, we are likely
to observe manufacturers forcing (or inducing) retailers to carry a broad
product line which includes products that are difficult to sell.72
VI. CONCLUSION
It is not necessary to invoke special consumer services or cartels to
explain why a rational manufacturer would impose vertical restrictions
on its retailers. Even if the only function the retailer performed was to
rent conveniently located shelf space, the manufacturer might find that
its selling costs were reduced by altering the incentives of the retailers-
restricting the retailers' choice on resale price, territories, the makeup of
the product line, the quantity of goods carried, and so forth.
The set of plausible explanations is considerably enriched when we
take into account the problems inherent in pricing services. That it is
difficult to explain why particular restrictions are adopted in a given con-
text should not be surprising. The task is akin to determining the proper
amount of aluminum to use in manufacturing a car. We have to know a
lot about the technology and the relative prices to even hazard a guess.
All I purport to do is to indicate some aspects of the technology of
selling.
Proponents of vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws should not
draw comfort from the fact that it is difficult to explain why specific re-
strictions are adopted in a given context. It seems clear that the class of
acts for which there is a plausible efficiency rationale is even broader than
the usual free-rider argument suggests. Because it is so difficult to deter-
mine the effect of various retailing strategies on costs, policymakers
should be cautious about imposing their judgments upon the industry.
Absent some plausible interbrand cartel arguments, the presumption
71 The problem of competition from retailers carrying only part of the product line is analogous
to the "sustainability" problem in regulated industries. See Panzar & Willig, Free Entry and Sus-
tainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1977).
72 Kenney & Klein, supra note 16, at 524-27, suggest some reasons for average cost pricing of
feature films.
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ought to be that the manufacturer knows best how to combine the inputs
into selling in the least costly manner. Courts should not second-guess
them by insisting upon "less restrictive alternatives, '73 unbundling,74
"competition on the merits, '75 and so forth.
Even activity that appears to be central to the operation of a cartel
can, upon careful inspection, often have a benign explanation. For exam-
ple, the activities of the National Association of Retail Druggists
(NARD) in the first four decades of this century, which included the
establishment of uniform retail prices and their enforcement with boy-
cotts wherever possible, certainly looked like those of a dealer cartel.76 I
would speculate that reinvestigation of that period would show that
much of NARD's policy can be explained by the "quality assurance"
argument developed in Section 3. The rhetoric would be that of price
fixing and cartels (at least until they had hired sophisticated lawyers who
polished their prose). But after we had pierced the rhetorical veil, we
would likely find a more reasonable explanation for the behavior.
It is generally argued that the Robinson-Patman Act protects the
"Mom and Pop" stores from the "big guys."' 77 The discussion here sug-
gests a different interpretation. By restricting a manufacturer's ability to
adjust his compensation for retailing services by means of discounts, re-
bates, and so forth, Robinson-Patman requires a manufacturer to make
more of its compensation in the form of a high gross margin. The higher
the gross margin, the more vulnerable the traditional retailers are to
competition from the discounters. It is, therefore, at least plausible that
the principal beneficiaries of the Robinson-Patman Act in the recent past
have been the discounters. That is, Robinson-Patman rules lead manu-
facturers to overcompensate discounters, and the strict enforcement of
laws against resale price maintenance and other vertical restrictions rein-
forces the effect. 78
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